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INTRODUCTION
The question of whether government should be open to public scrutiny is
important in a society that calls itself democratic and free. The extent to
which information about how government functions is available to the elec-
torate may determine both the meaningfulness of citizen participation in the
democratic process and the accountability of government officials to the
public will. On the other hand, government effectiveness may often depend
upon confidentiality and secrecy. Although much government information is
open to the public under the Freedom of Information Act' and although most
states have statutes allowing access to public records and legislative body
meetings,2 the post-Vietnam War trend in which this "sunshine" legislation
was enacted could change. The question arises, therefore, whether the first
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution guarantee that government
information3 will be available to the public.'
Two related lines of cases have brought before the Supreme Court ques-
tions bearing on a constitutional open government guarantee. The preferential
treatment cases5 presented the question of whether the press as proxy for the
public is entitled to special first amendment privileges exempting it from
certain common duties, the theory being that the press needs the privilege to
fulfill its office of providing information about government and government
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977).
2. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1163 n.1169,
1188 n.1307 (1975).
3. This Comment discusses the question of whether the first amendment secures a public right to know
information controlled by the government that concerns government operations or actions. The somewhat
related question of whether there is a public right to require disclosure of information from private individuals is
not discussed. For a brief discussion of the latter question, see Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1513-15 (1974).
4. The question of who would have standing to sue on behalf of the public to vindicate the public right is
also not discussed. The question of standing to sue does not usually arise in the first amendment context,
because first amendment rights are believed to inhere in individuals. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 8-14 (1970). But the right to know may be based upon rights which inhere in the
body politic. See text accompanying notes 17-20 infra. If the right to know is a public rather than an individual
right, the standing issue may arise. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (standing denied
to a taxpayer who could demonstrate only injury common to the public at large). See generally Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
5. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See text accompanying notes 40-52 infra.
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officials to the public. The right of access cases6 presented the question of
whether the first amendment secures access to sources of government infor-
mation to the press, again as the public's agent, or to the public in general. A
common question underlies these lines of cases: apart from, or derivative of,
its literal protection of speech and press freedom, does the first amendment
independently guarantee to the public a right to know government controlled
information about the operations of government v
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,8 a fragmented Supreme Court held
that the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution guarantee
a public right to witness criminal trials. 9 This Comment examines the question
of whether the rationales adduced to support the ruling in Richmond News-
papers are or should be applicable to sources of government information
other than criminal trials. In other words, is Richmond Newspapers limited to
its particular facts or can the case be read to support a generalized right to
obtain government information from government sources? In Part I the cur-
rent debate among commentators on whether the right to know can be legiti-
mately derived from the Constitution will be discussed. The Supreme Court's
treatment of the right to know prior to Richmond Newspapers will be
examined in Part II. In Part III the several opinions of the Justices in
Richmond Newspapers will be analyzed to determine the scope and doctrinal
foundations of the holding in the case. While the conclusion that Richmond
Newspapers is weak precedent for a generalized right to know is irresistible,
four Justices strongly support such a right.'0 No doubt the tension in the case
between the scope of protection afforded the right to witness trials and the
constitutional underpinnings of that right will require the Court in the future to
decide whether the open trial guarantee is an instance of a generalized first
amendment right to know.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DERIVATION OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW
The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . ".".." " Clearly, the
6. Gannett v. Depasquala, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. The
Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See text accompanying notes
53-77 infra.
7. The right to know question has generated a wealth of scholarly commentary. E.g., BeVier, An Inform-
ed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as BeVier]; Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1976);
Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); O'Brien, The First Amend-
ment and the Public's Right to Know, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980); Note, The Public's Right ofAccess
to Government Information Under the First Amendment, 51 CHI-KENT L. REV. 177 (1974); Note, The Rights of
the Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Public's Right to Know:
Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. The Washington Post, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 829 (1975); Note, The First
Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980); Comment, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information after Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975).
8. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9. Seven Justices concurred in the judgment. No opinion commanded the support of more than three
Justices. See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
10. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. See note 92 infra.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[Vol. 42:831
1981] RIGHT OF ACCESS 833
first amendment does protect the public's interest in being informed about its
government. Under traditional first amendment analysis, 12 unreasonable
governmental interference with freedom of speech and press is prohibited. 3
In a negative sense this prohibition advances the public interest in being
aware of government actions. At the time the Constitution was ratified, ensur-
ing speech and press freedoms was probably sufficient to permit citizens to
obtain essential facts and to communicate with one another about the course
of government.'4 One commentator has argued that this situation no longer
prevails:
Because of their [government's] scale and complexity, coupled with the interde-
pendence of all aspects of society, government itself is often the chief, if not the
only, source of information for the people about the conduct of those who are
supposed to be the people's agents. The central problem today is how to deal with
government secrecy and--all too often-with government deception. ' 5
In light of this state of affairs the question arises whether the Constitution
provides positive protection for the public's need to know. Does the first
amendment, independent of its protection of speech and press freedoms,
guarantee that the public's interest in knowing shall be protected?
Standing alone, the literal text of the first amendment neither mentions
nor seems to imply a right to know.' 6 The constitutional history of the amend-
ment appears to be inconclusive as to whether the framers intended the
amendment to guarantee vindication of the public interest in being informed.' 7
Moreover, at least one commentator has pointed out that the constitutional
value of informed speech or press is different from that of free speech and
press.' 8 Free speech objectives' 9 are not necessarily frustrated by excessive
12. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
13. The modem version of Justice Holmes' balancing test is discussed in Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482
(1975).
14. Cox, Forward: Freedom of Expression and the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1980).
15. Id. at 24.
16. Arguably, when access to government information is denied, the press is less "free" to print articles
about the subject of such information. Government's refusal to permit access to public places, such as parks and
streets, may abridge the rights of speakers. Similarly, government's denial of access to sources of information
may abridge the rights of potential listeners-those who would wish to hear the information that would be
disclosed. At least where opportunities to gather information existed in the past, government's curtailment of
such activities can plausibly be viewed as interference with the activity rather than refusal to facilitate it. See
Cox, Forward: Freedom of Expression and the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23 (1980).
17. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579,
589-603 (1980). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1970).
18. BeVier, supra note 7, at 499. Professor BeVier argues that:
[G]overnmental denial of access to information poses a different kind of direct threat to speech than do
punishment and censorship, and thus the forms of governmental activity directly implicate different
values. Punishment or censorship directly undermine [sic] the value of free speech, while the denial of
access to information undermines the value of well-informed speech.
(Emphasis in original.) But to the extent that free speech and informed speech are both necessary to advance the
constitutional objective the framers intended free speech to advance, it would not seem to matter that they serve
somewhat different values. There are significant areas of overlap between these two kinds of government
activity.
19. Professor Emerson has identified four functions of the system of free expression:
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government secrecy, since such secrecy does not affect the freedom of indi-
viduals to speak their minds or of the press to print. But government secrecy
does impair the value of informed speech. To the extent that government
refuses to divulge relevant information, speech and press are less informed.
How, then, can the first amendment be read to guarantee that speech and
press shall be not only free but also informed?
The writings of the late Professor Alexander Meiklejohn indicate that
these two values-free speech and informed speech-may coalesce in the
achievement of a broader constitutional objective: 20 the intelligent exercise of
the ballot, or, more broadly, the integrity of the democratic process. If this is
true and if vindication of this objective is a primary purpose of the first
amendment, direct protection should be given to both of these constitutional
values.
Meiklejohn's "structural' 21 theory is premised on the proposition that
the paramount function of the first amendment is fostering and preserving the
structure of republican government prescribed by the Constitution.
Meiklejohn derived his structural theory from the nature and requirements of
self-government and their relationship to the express freedoms guaranteed by
the first amendment. For Meiklejohn, democracy implies freedom of speech:
"[T]he principle of freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government .... It is a deduction from the basic American
Agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage. '
'12
Meiklejohn believed that the protection of speech freedom is itself aimed at
the broader social-goal of making meaningful the exercise of the franchise. He
contended that the amendment protects "forms of thought and expression
within the range of human communications from which the voter derives the
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane
and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express."3
Under Meiklejohn's analysis the right to know would receive protection for
(1) assuring individual self-fulfillment; (2) advancing knowledge and discovering truth; (3) providing for
citizen participation in the democratic process; and (4) achieving community stability by maintaining a
balance between necessary consensus and dissent.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
20. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL FREEDOM];
Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234 (1966); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 245. See also Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The
Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 42-51 (1974); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
21. Both Justices Brennan and Stewart use the word "structural" to refer to their first amendment
theories. Compare Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979), with Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.J. 631 (1975). Justice Brennan's theory borrows heavily from Meiklejohn. Justice
Brennan's structural theory is that the first amendment guarantees a public right to be informed because such a
right is necessary if the amendment is to fulfill its mission of preserving the integrity of the democratic process.
See Part III B infra. Justice Stewart's structural theory is that the press clause of the first amendment should be
read separately from the speech clause to give special protection to the institutional press. This Comment uses
the term "structural" to refer to Justice Brennan's theory and the term "institutional" to refer to that of Justice
Stewart.
22. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 26.
23. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256.
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the same reasons as speech and press freedoms: to preserve the integrity of
the election process and thus maintain the conditions essential for the survival
of the constitutionally prescribed form of government. Since under modern
conditions protection of speech and press freedoms may be insufficient to
ensure the kind of meaningful communication about public affairs necessary
for self-government, this analysis would guarantee independent protection of
a right to know. Meiklejohn believed that in principle the right to vote implies
a right to know:
When a free man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone
else, by some scholar or administrator or legislator. The voters must have it, all of
them.... That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief,
no relevant information, may be kept from them. 24
While agreeing with Meiklejohn that nonarticulated constitutional rights
can be derived from the structure of the government prescribed by the Consti-
tution, Professor Lillian BeVier contends that the first amendment should not
be interpreted to guarantee an informed electorate.2 BeVier's chief objection
to judicial protection of a right to know independent of protection of free-
doms of speech and press is that the Constitution has placed protection of this
right in the hands of the executive and legislative branches of government. If
this is true, judicial protection of a right to know would be an unwarranted
usurpation of power and might work more to frustrate than to preserve consti-
tutional democracy.
BeVier's conclusion that the value of informed speech and press should
not be afforded separate protection is drawn from two sources. First, she
rejects Meiklejohn's conception of constitutional self-government. The con-
stitutionally ordained role for the citizen in government, she argues, is "con-
siderably more attenuated ' 2 6 than that envisioned by Meiklejohn. The "basic
American agreement,- 2 7 she urges, is not that "public issues shall be decided
by universal suffrage, ' 28 but rather that "public issues shall be decided by
representatives of the people who shall be elected by universal suffrage., 29
For BeVier, the primary purpose of the first amendment is to protect "the
process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which
our representatives must govern.
' 30
BeVier's argument here is weak. Her conclusion does not differ appreci-
ably from Meiklejohn's conclusion that the first amendment's primary func-
tion is to preserve democracy by ensuring the existence of conditions under
which the franchise can be exercised intelligently. But BeVier would not
24. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 75 (emphasis added).
25. BeVier, supra note 7, at 485.
26. Id. at 505.
27. Id.
28. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 20, at 27.
29. BeVier, supra note 7, at 505.
30. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 309 (1978).
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permit the Supreme Court to ensure that the will of the people is actually
expressed to the representatives, even though her conclusion as to the first
amendment's purpose is consistent with the extension by the Supreme Court
of protection to a right to know. The protection of speech and press freedoms
may be insufficient to guarantee that the ballot expresses the true will of the
majority. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the will of the majority is to be
formed when the voters lack important information, or worse, when they are
deceived by government officials. BeVier fails to address the question of the
efficacy of traditional first amendment protection to ensure that the admitted
purpose of the amendment-advancing the integrity of the election process-
can be achieved. Meiklejohn's analysis appears to be better suited to resolve
this question.
The second reason BeVier rejects independent protection of a first
amendment right to know is her concern that neutral principles31 could not be
formulated to guide or restrain judges faced with the task of deciding partic-
ular right to know cases. Meiklejohn's arguments are based upon an analysis
of constitutional ends or objectives. He does not generally address the ques-
tion of what means may be legitimate to implement the ends he derives.
BeVier's argument that goal-neutral rules could not be constructed is a means
argument. It addresses the question of the legitimacy of the Court's protecting
a right to know without discovering or creating neutral principles that trans-
cend the results of particular cases and that can be applied evenhandedly to
similar situations. BeVier's objection is not that the Court lacks judicial
power or authority to derive unarticulated rights from the form of government
ordained by the Constitution.3 2 It is rather that the only justification for sub-
stantive judicial review of majoritarian decisions is the subjugation of such
review to the constraints of neutral principles.
The thesis that neutral principles both bind the scope of and justify the
substance of judicial review was put forth in 1959 by Professor Wechsler.
Wechsler's requirement of neutral principles must be understood as a re-
sponse to Judge Learned Hand's indictment of judicial supremacy, the
uniquely American practice of allowing the judiciary to serve as final arbiter
of legal validity. 33 Judge Hand contended that judicial supremacy is unwar-
ranted because when it determines the constitutionality of a law, the Court
acts in a legislative manner, weighing the costs and benefits of the legislation
in relation to public policy objectives.34 Professor Wechsler contended that
judicial supremacy is warranted, but only when judges apply neutral princi-
31. The leading article on the requirement of neutral principles in constitutional adjudication is Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). On the same subject see also
BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I
(1971).
32. BeVier contends that constitutional rules are legitimate if they are derived from the text of the Constitu-
tion, from its history, or from the structure of goverment it prescribes. BeVier, supra note 7, at 499-500.
33. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1968).
34. Id. at 1-56.
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pies in deciding cases. Hence, BeVier's argument in opposition to judicial
recognition of a right to know is that such right will not be interpreted
neutrally and in accordance with principle.
In response to BeVier, it can be argued either that the right to know can be
formulated in terms of neutral principles or that it need not be so formulated.
There would appear to be no reason in principle why goal-neutral rules could
not be constructed to implement a first amendment right to know. Moreover,
the requirement of neutral principles has been effectively criticized. 35 There is
no reason why the principles according to which a court decides a case should
be neutral in the sense of not favoring one side or the other. That the rule of
law favors one of the parties is less important than that it be applied even-
handedly in similar situations. In Richmond Newspapers Justice Brennan
argued for judicial restraint and sensitivity in applying the right to attend
trials.36 Such restraint and sensitivity could be applied as well in implementing
a generalized right to know government information. Thus BeVier's neutral
principle objection need not prevent the Court from recognizing an indepen-
dent right to know
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT TO KNow
In many first amendment cases in the past few- decades, the Supreme
Court has referred to the press' special role under the Constitution of inform-
ing the public.37 The Court has also referred to a right of the public to receive a
free flow of information about government. 8 Since these cases involved con-
tent-based interference with the freedom to speak or publish, the question of
whether an independent right to know should be protected was not presented
to the Court.39 Two recent lines of cases, however, have presented questions
directly implicating an independent right to know.
A. The Preferential Treatment Cases
Branzburg v. Hayes,40 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,4' and Herbert v.
Lando42 presented the question whether the press should be given preferred
35. Richards, Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and
Constitutional Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069, 1084-89 (1977).
36. 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
37. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
38. Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367,390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,564 (1969); Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64,74-75
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
39. The commercial speech cases appear to support a right to receive information from willing speakers. To
the extent these cases rest upon independent protection of the information flow itself, apart from the freedom of
individuals to speak or publish, they are indirect precedent for a right to know government information under
government control. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 444 U.S. 962 (1980); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
40. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
41. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
42. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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treatment under the first amendment to ensure its ability to inform the public,
thus vindicating the value of an informed public independently of that of free
speech and press. 43 The first amendment had been held to protect'postpubli-
cation activities, such as the dissemination of news.44 Here the Court was
asked to apply the amendment to prepublication activities, such as the gather-
ing and selecting of printable material.
In Branzburg,45 having refused to reveal the identity of a confidential
source to a grand jury, a reporter claimed a qualified press privilege to protect
confidential sources to ensure that the information flow to the public would
not be choked off at its source. The Court responded to this claim with skepti-
cism. Though denying the requested privilege, it indicated that prepublication
activities are protected: "Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not
qualify for first amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
46
In Zurcher,47 the press contended that the first amendment prohibits
third-party searches of newsrooms and seizures of items found there when a
less intrusive means of obtaining the items is available. Without citing any
legal or factual authority, the Court rejected the press' contention that confi-
dential sources would dry up if newsrooms could be routinely searched.
In Herbert,4s the press claimed a first amendment media privilege of
immunity from a civil discovery order seeking disclosure of the thoughts and
impressions of a reporter at the time when he wrote an allegedly libelous
editorial. 49 While acknowledging the press' role in advancing "the important
public interest in a free flow of news and commentary," 50 the Court rejected
the contention that inquiry into editorial conclusions actually threatens the
suppression of truthful information.
The Court's rejection in these cases of the press' claims for preferential
treatment was based in part upon the Court's conclusions that privileges were
not needed to protect the press' function of informing the public and in part
upon the weight the Court afforded the countervailing interests involved in
the cases. The Court denied that the press clause of the first amendment itself
guaranteed special privileges for the press, but it did not deny that prepublica-
tion activities of the press were entitled to protection to vindicate the public's
interest in being informed about government. The protection of such activities
43. See discussion of these cases in Bevier, supra note 7, at 494-97.
44. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive publications); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (right to distribute publications).
45. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
46. Id. at 707.
47. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
48. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
49. Id. at 158-59.
50. Id. at 179-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. The Court's conclusion in the case was undoubtedly based in large part on the standard set forth in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which requires that the plaintiff in a libel action prove "actual
malice" (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). Plaintiff would have no way of proving
knowledge if he could not discover the reporter's thoughts and impressions. 441 U.S. 153, 172 (1979).
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may rest upon the press' instrumental role in providing a free flow of informa-
tion to the public. 2 If the public has no right to the information flow other
than the negative protection afforded it by the protection of speech and press
freedoms, then there can be no claim for privileges to secure that information
flow. Since the Court in all of these cases addressed the merits of the press'
claims, it is clear that the Court was not prepared to reject in principle a first
amendment right to know. The results of these cases indicate, however, that if
the Court eventually does recognize a generalized right to know, its contours
will most probably be very narrowly drawn.
B. The Access Cases Prior to Richmond Newspapers
In Pell v. Procunier,53 Saxbe v. Washington Post,54 Houchins v.
KQED,55 and Gannett v. Depasquala,56 the press, as proxy or surrogate for
the public, sought a constitutional right of access to newsworthy information
in the government's control. The press did not claim special privileges in
these cases, but instead sought access in the name of the general public.
Hence, the issue was whether the first amendment guarantees a public right of
access to government information. Because access rights implicate only the
right to be informed, and not the right to speak or publish, the underlying
question in these cases was whether the public has a right to know. At the
same time that a majority of the Court failed in these cases to confront the
public access or right to know questions, the various opinions offered demon-
strate a Court struggling with these issues.
In Pel157 and in Saxbe,58 the Court held that on the facts of the respective
cases, reporters did not have a first amendment right of access to prisons to
interview preselected inmates and report on prison conditions. The press
claimed a right of access to fulfill the public right to be informed about prison
conditions. By characterizing the press' claim as one for special access rights
not available to the general public, Justice Stewart, writing for bare majorities
of the Court, avoided the underlying right to know issue.59 In Pell, the public's
right to know was not impaired by the interview ban because the district court
found that (1) general access to all parts of the the prison existed, (2) interviews
52. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). Both Justice Stewart's institutional theory
of the first amendment and Justice Brennan's structural theory would provide protection for prepublication
activities of the press. Justice Stewart would draw the line at access to government information, while Justice
Brennan would allow a conditional right of access. See Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979). For
conflicting views on the question of whether as a matter of policy the press should have preferred constitutional
status, see Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1979), and Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism ?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595
(1979).
53. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
54. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
55. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
56. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
57. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
58. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
59. 417 U.S. 843 (1974); 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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with randomly selected inmates were permitted, and (3) the press actually
enjoyed greater access rights than the general public.' In contrast, the district
court in Saxbe entered specific findings of fact that the ban on interviews
with preselected inmates precluded fair and accurate reporting of prison con-
ditions. 61 Hence, in Saxbe the de facto public interest in knowing about the
conditions of local prisons was impaired. Justice Powell's dissent, in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, argued in favor of independently and
affirmatively protecting the value of informed speech:
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in preserving
free public discussion of governmental affairs .... The ... First Amendment is
one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to intelligent self-
government.... [P]ublic debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be
informed.62
In Houchins,63 a four Justice plurality64 held that reporters had no right to
bring television cameras into an area of a county jail, despite a finding that
conditions there constituted cruel and unusual punishment and allegedly had
been responsible for the suicide of an inmate. Three Justices in Houchins
appeared to reject flatly independent protection of a first amendment informa-
tion right. These Justices asserted that any affirmative guarantee of an in-
formed electorate should be accomplished by the executive or legislative
branches of government. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, in which Justices
White and Rehnquist joined, stated that the first amendment does not man-
date access to public institutions. 6 The fourth member, Justice Stewart, con-
curring in the plurality, categorically rejected a right of access component to
the first amendment: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guaran-
tee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by
government." 67
After' Saxbe was decided, but before Houchins came up for argument,
Justice Stevens joined the Court, replacing Justice Douglas. Justice Stevens
wrote the dissenting opinion for Houchins, in which Justices Brennan and
Powell joined.68 He echoed Justice Powell's dissent in Saxbe69 supporting a
first amendment right to be informed. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not
participate in Houchins. How the case would have come out had these
60. 364 F. Supp. 196, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
61. Saxbe v. The Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974), rev'g, Kleindienst v. The Washington Post, 357 F.
Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972).
62. 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (quoting Brief for Petitioners 42-48).
63. 438 U.S. 1 (1979).
64. Only seven Justices participated in the case. Chief Justice Burger wrote the principal opinion, in which
Justices White and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart concurred separately. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Powell and Brennan, dissented.
65. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
66. "Neither the First Amendment, nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to govern-
ment information or sources of information within the government's control." 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1979).
67. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. 417 U.S. 843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Justices participated is anyone's guess. Because he joined Justice Powell's
dissent in Saxbe, it is reasonably certain that Justice Marshall would have
joined with Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell. Based on his votes in Pell
and Saxbe, it appears that Justice Blackmun would have joined Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stewart to form a five to four
majority.70 The prison-access cases thus cast doubt upon the vitality of a first
amendment right to know. But these cases did not entirely reject protection
of such a right. The Court simply avoided the question. By characterizing the
press' claims as claims for special access, the Court or plurality could reject
this claim without actually deciding what access rights, if any, are guaranteed
to the public generally.
Gannett7' presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify its position
on a first amendment right of access. In Gannett two defendants were charged
with the murder of a man who was killed while boating. The newspaper
petitioner gave extensive coverage to the incident and to police efforts to
solve the crime. After their indictment, defendants moved to suppress the
statements they had given to police after their arrest and the physical evi-
dence seized as fruits of the allegedly involuntary confessions. At the hearing
on these motions defense attorneys moved to exclude the public and the press
from the hearing on the grounds that the buildup of adverse publicity threat-
ened defendants' right to a fair trial. Believing that the public and the press
have a constitutional right of access to the criminal justice system,72 the trial
judge nonetheless closed the hearing on the grounds that, on balance, defen-
dants' right to a fair trial in this instance outweighed the public right to witness
the performance of the criminal justice system.
On its certiorari review of the closure of the pretrial hearing, the Supreme
Court virtually ignored the first amendment claim of the newspaper peti-
tioner. Five Justices in Gannett concluded that under the sixth amendment
the public may not insist upon access to a pretrial hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence. Justice Stewart's majority opinion explicitly declined to
address the question of whether there is a first amendment right of access to
criminal trials.73 Justice Stewart was willing to assume arguendo that the
newspaper petitioner had a valid first amendment right of access to the hear-
ing.74 He concluded, however, that the trial judge had given "all appropriate
deference"' to this claim.
Justice Blackmun's dissent for four Justices also paid little attention to
the first amendment claim. The opinion traced the history of open judicial
proceedings to its colonial and English roots. Despite the fact that the sixth
70. Justice Blackmun voted with the majority to deny access in both Pell and Saxbe.
71. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
72. Id. at 376.
73. Id. at 392.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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amendment appears to guarantee rights meant for the benefit of the accused,76
Justice Blackmun concluded that this amendment could be read to secure as
well a public right to insist upon open judicial proceedings.
Justice Powell's concurrence addressed the first amendment question
that the majority reserved and concluded that the amendment does guarantee
access to judicial proceedings. Weighing the public's first amendment right to
open proceedings against the defendants' rights to a fair trial, Justice Powell
agreed with the trial judge that under the circumstances presented in Gannett
the latter rights must prevail.
It is lamentable that the Court made no attempt in Gannett to distinguish
or explain the prison access cases. Surely some explanation of the Court's
reasoning was in order. After all, the claim that the first amendment guaran-
tees public access to observe the penal system is not so very different from
the claim that the same amendment guarantees access to the judicial system. 77
In seizing upon the sixth amendment, the dissenting Justices avoided embroil-
ing the Court in the right to know controversy that had divided it in the prison
access cases. The dissenting Justices possibly wanted to locate the right of
access to the judicial system in the sixth amendment to avoid the necessity of
distinguishing the prison access cases. The circumvention of the first amend-
ment right to know issue and the uncertainty the case left in light of the access
cases meant that the Court would have to deal with the issue eventually. As
could be expected, it reappeared the next term in the case of Richmond
78Newspapers v. Virginia.
C. The Facts and Holding of Richmond Newspapers
Richmond Newspapers presented a factual setting similar to that in
Gannett. At a defendant's fourth trial79 for the murder of a hotel manager,
defense counsel moved that the trial be closed to the press and public because
of adverse newspaper publicity. The prosecutor did not oppose this motion.
The trial judge concluded that the Virginia Code80 empowered him to order
76. The sixth amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . .to a public trial .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See 443 U.S. 368, 415-20 (1979) for Justice
Blackmun's argument that the literal text of the amendment should not control.
77. In Richmond Newspapers the Court distinguished the prison access cases on the ground that trials have
traditionally been open to the public, whereas prisons traditionally have not been open. But allowing access only
to institutions that enjoy a history of openness may be insufficient to ensure that the public need for information
is satisfied, especially since many government institutions have only come into being in the past few decades.
78. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
79. Defendant's conviction after his first trial was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court because evi-
dence was improperly admitted against him. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 136 (1977).
The retrial ended in a mistrial when a juror asked to be excused and no alternate was available. A third trial
ended in a mistrial, allegedly due to the newspaper accounts of previous trials. 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980).
80. The trial judged relied upon "VA. CODE § 19.2-266, which states:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the Court may, in
its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
The Supreme Court did not treat appellant's claims as drawing this statute itself into question. Rather, the Court
treated appellant's attack on the closure as raising claims under the Constitution that would place constitutional
limitations on the discretion of trial judges to close criminal trials without consideration of the first amendment
rights of the public to witness such trials. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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closure, and accordingly he ordered the trial closed. Later the same day
appellants, Richmond Newspapers and two of its reporters, sought and were
granted a hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order. Appellants urged
that the first and sixth amendments required the judge to consider whether
any less intrusive means of preserving defendant's right to a fair trial were
available. Without considering any first amendment rights of appellants or of
the public, the trial judge denied the motion to vacate and ordered the trial
continued with the closure order in effect.8' The next day defendant was
acquitted, and tapes of the trial were made available to the public.1
2
Two weeks later appellants were granted leave to intervene in the case
nunc pro tunc. The Virginia Supreme Court denied plenary review of the
closure order, but the United States Supreme Court granted appellant's peti-
tion for certiorari. Although the defendant was acquitted, the Supreme Court
held that the issue was not moot because the "underlying dispute" was one
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." 3 The Virginia Supreme Court's
refusal to give plenary review could reasonably have led to other trials being
closed without consideration of the first amendment rights of the press and
public. This was already happening as a result of the Gannett84 decision.
Richmond Newspapers evoked seven opinions from the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Burger authored a three-Justice "plurality" opinion. 85 Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment.86 Justices
Stevens,u Stewart,88 and Blackmun 9 filed separate opinions concurring in
the judgment. Justice Rehnquist dissented 9° and Justice Powell did not parti-
cipate in the case. Seven Justices concurred in the holding that the first and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution guarantee a public right to
witness criminal trials. In light of the divisions among the Justices and in light
of prior right to know cases, exactly what Richmond Newspapers stands for is
an open question. 9' In the right of access and preferential treatment cases,
four Justices had argued strongly for protection of a first amendment right to
81. 448 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1980).
82. Id. at 562 n.3.
83. Id. at 563 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
84. See Brief Amici Curiae on behalf of Reporters Committee for Freedom, The Associated Press Manag-
ing Editors, The National Association of Broadcasters, and The Virginia Press Association in Richmond News-
papers. As an Appendix to their brief these amici submitted the Court Watch Study. The study shows fifty-one
attempts to close criminal proceedings in the first seven weeks after Gannett was decided. The study also shows
that twenty-six of these attempts were successful.
85. 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
86. Id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 582--84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. One commentator has called Richmond Newspapers "one of the two or three most important decisions
in the whole history of the first amendment." Goodale, The Three Part Open Door Test in Richmond News-
paper Case, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1980, at 26, col.I. See also Goodale, Gannett is Burned by Richmond's
First Amendment 'Sunshine Act', Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 24 (arguing that Richmond Newspapers adopts
a first amendment right to know).
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be informed. 92 Arguably, the other five had rejected this putative right. 93
Richmond Newspapers is the first case that stands as precedent, however
weak, for a first amendment right to know.
III. THE SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS
OF RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS
A majority of the Court in Richmond Newspapers distinguished Gannett
on the basis of history. Criminal trials have been open to the public for
centuries in the Anglo-American system of justice, while pretrial hearings,
themselves a relatively recent phenomenon, have not traditionally been
open.94 As some Justices noted, 95 this difference could also distinguish the
prison access cases from Richmond Newspapers. No doubt the history of
openness of criminal trials is the key to the holding in Richmond Newspapers.
Why history should be controlling is unclear. The public need to be informed
about a: particular government institution or process is unrelated to the ques-
tion whether the public has historically been afforded access to that institution
or process. What is the relationship between the legal history of criminal trials
and the first and fourteenth amendments, upon which the Court predicated its
ruling?
None of the Justices appeared to employ legal history to determine the
intentions of the- framers in penning the first amendment.96 If the Justices had
wanted to invoke the intentions of the framers, it would seem that the history
of the first amendment would have been the relevant inquiry, although the
history of open trials might also be relevant to indicate the climate in which
the first amendment was adopted. The Justices did not rely upon the history
of the first amendment in Richmond Newspapers.97 Chief Justice Burger
employed the history of open trials to characterize the ruling as, and possibly
to limit it to, access to places, such as sidewalks and parks, traditionally open
to the exercise of first amendment rights. This analysis is consistent with a
traditional interpretation of the first amendment, under which government's
refusal to permit access to places traditionally open to the exercise of first
amendment freedoms is viewed not as a failure to facilitate those freedoms
92. Justice Powell in Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Justice Stevens inHouchins,
438 U.S. 1, 23 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 584
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall has not authored an opinion in this area of the law; however,
he joined with Justice Powell in Saxbe and with Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers.
93. Chief Justice Burger in Houchins, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Justice Rehnquist in
Gannett, 443 U.S. 368,403 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Justice Stewart in Houchins, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Justice Blackmun in Gannett, 443 U.S. 368, 406 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Justice White has not authored any opinions in this area, but he joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Houchins and Stewart's opinions in Pell and Saxbe.
94. 448 U.S. 555, 576 n.11 (1980).
95. Id. See also id. at 599.
96. Chief Justice Burger may have meant to reason from the framer's intent when he wrote: "The Bill of
Rights was enacted against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open. Public access to
trials was then regarded as an important aspect of the process itself..... 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). But, the
Chief Justice failed to develop this position.
97. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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but as an indirect interference with their exercise. Thus, under this analysis,
the first amendment could be interpreted to secure public access to trials as
open public forums without guaranteeing a right to be informed.
In contrast, Justice Brennan used history as a guide to determine the
feasibility of allowing access to particular government institutions or proces-
ses. Justice Brennan's opinion indicates that he would not limit access to
government information solely to those sources of government information
that enjoy a tradition of openness.98 The meaning of Richmond Newspapers
may depend upon which use of legal history the other members of the Court
find more persuasive.
A. Chief Justice Burger's Three-Justice Plurality Opinion
The Chief Justice's reliance on the first amendment seemed to be an
afterthought. In the first part of his opinion Chief Justice Burger traced the
jury trial back to its historical antecedents, pointing out that history would
be "instructive. "99 He pointed to the social benefits of open trials, saying that
they are therapeutic in aiding a community to achieve a catharsis after
a particularly horrible crime has occurred. They fulfill the public's expectation
that justice will be satisfied by the appearance of justice. A third benefit is
public education about the criminal justice system.' °° The Chief Justice's
conclusion in this part of his opinion does not seem to contemplate the first
amendment. "From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under
our system of justice. "'' When Chief Justice Burger finally discussed the first
amendment, his comments indicated that his reliance on that amendment was
not to provide independent protection to the public's need to be informed
about the judicial system, but instead to vindicate traditional speech and press
freedoms. Since these freedoms include the right to hear or listen,'02 the Chief
Justice seemed to construe the closure order as an unwarranted interference
with traditionally defined first amendment freedoms. The conclusion that he
construed the issue in this fashion finds support in his invocation of the
"public forum" doctrine, which prior cases had suggested'33 The rationale of
the public forum doctrine is that first amendment freedoms could be rendered
meaningless if government could arbitrarily deny certain speakers-those
whose views are unpopular-the use of public facilities, such as parks and
sidewalks, to exercise those freedoms.3' Relying on the history of openness
98. Id. at 586-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. at 571-73.
101. Id. at 573.
102. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
103. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See cases cited in Cass, First Amendment Access to Government
Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1288-98 (1979).
104. Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1298 (1979).
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of criminal trials and on statements in prior cases that courtrooms are public
domains,'0 5 Chief Justice Burger concluded in effect that denial of access to
criminal trials could be construed as government interference with the exer-
cise of first amendment freedoms.
When viewed in this light, Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not seem
to address the question whether an information value or a right to know
component of the first amendment is entitled to affirmative protection. By
invoking the public forum doctrine he could accomplish the objective of
informing the public about the operation of the trial stage of the judicial
process without giving independent protection to the public interest in being
so informed. Chief Justice Burger's first amendment analysis creates con-
fusion in that in some places it goes beyond the public forum doctrine and
appears to contemplate independent protection of a limited first amendment
right to know. There is, therefore, a tension in the Chief Justice's opinion.
In explaining why the first amendment guarantees a right to witness
criminal trials, Chief Justice Burger quoted language from two cases that
arguably have little to do with a right to obtain information from a government
unwilling to divulge it. From First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti106 Chief
Justice Burger quoted the following language: "[T]he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw." 107 Bellotti involved a government attempt to limit the stock
of public information, not by refusing to divulge information in its control but
by prohibiting certain speech of certain individuals. The issue in Bellotti was
whether government can limit the amount of money a banking corporation
can spend to advertise its viewpoint on a referendum issue, such expenditures
being considered "speech" for first amendment purposes.'
From Kleindienst v. Mandel,'09 the Chief Justice cited this language: "In
a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to
'receive information and ideas.' "o Mandel involved the issue of whether a
foreign scholar must be admitted to the United States to vindicate the rights of
American citizens who wished to hear him speak. The right to receive infor-
mation referred to by the Court in this case was not a right of access to
government information but a right to receive information from speakers
willing to divulge it.
Taken out of context and placed in a case in which the issue is the right to
obtain government information, these quotes from Bellotti and Mandel appear
105. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the Courtroom
is public property."); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (The public
has a "deep interest" in open trials.).
106. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
107. Id. at 783.
108. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
109. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
110. Id. at 762.
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to support independent protection of a right to be informed. When govern-
ment refuses to allow access to trials (or to other sources of government
information), the "stock of information from which members of the public
may draw" ' is diminished and the "right to receive information and ideas" is
abridged. However, the issue in Bellotti and Mandel was not access to gov-
ernment information, but government interference with the process of com-
munication between willing speaker and listeners.
Chief Justice Burger's use of the Bellotti and Mandel quotations in
Richmond Newspapers, without an attempt to explain or distinguish the
former cases, causes confusion. Justice Stevens seems to have interpreted the
Chief Justice's opinion as providing independent protection for a right to be
informed. Justice Stevens joined the opinion of the Chief Justice, but concur-
red separately to point out what he believed the case to hold. According to
Justice Stevens, Richmond Newspapers squarely holds that the "acquisition
of newsworthy matter" is entitled to "constitutional protection." 2 Only if
Justice Stevens' interpretation of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is correct can
the decision be read to find strong support for an affirmative protection of the
right to be informed.
B. Justice Brennan's Concurrence
Justice Brennan would base the holding in Richmond Newspapers upon
the right of the public to be informed about the judicial process. Adopting
Meiklejohn's approach," 3 Justice Brennan derives a first amendment right to
know from the structure of the republican government ordained by the Consti-
tution." 4
[Tihe First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.... Implicit in
this structural role is not only "the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"... but the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must be informed. The
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for
communication itself, but for the indispensable conditions of meaningful com-
munication. 11
5
Justice Brennan's reply to commentators such as Professor BeVier," 6
who contend that goal-neutral rules designed to vindicate a right to know
cannot be constructed, is simply that judges must exercise judicial sensitivity
111. 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
112. 448 U.S. 555, 582 (1980).
113. See Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
114. 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980).
115. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
116. See notes 7, 18, 30-32 supra.
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and restraint in right to know cases. Because the stretch of protection in right
to know cases is endless, judges must have some guidance. It is for this reason
that Justice Brennan turns to legal history. A tradition of openness, he
asserts, implies a favorable judgment of experience. Moreover, the "Consti-
tution carries the gloss of history."' 17 While tradition is a useful guide, how-
ever, it is not to be determinative. Besides tradition, Justice Brennan sets
forth a second "guiding principle" "8 to help judges in right to know or right of
access cases. Under this "structural significance"" 9 principle, access to
government institutions and processes would be limited to those institutions
and processes whose social goals are furthered by permitting public access. A
government process whose objectives are advanced by public access is said to
have "structural significance." Although the Justice does not say so explic-
itly, it is clear from his whole opinion that under appropriate circumstances
government institutions that have not traditionally been open may possess
structural significance.
Open trials serve many of the goals of the criminal justice system. Public
access to trials serves as a check on possible abuse of judicial power and
thereby helps to ensure that defendants receive fair trials. Open trials also
advance other objectives the judicial system is designed to serve, such as
fulfilling the public's expectation that justice will be satisfied by the appear-
ance of justice and the theraputic and educational goals mentioned by Chief
Justice Burger.2 To this extent trials possess structural significance. Many of
these same considerations apply equally well to prisons. Although prisons
do not enjoy a tradition of openness, permitting reasonable access to them will
serve as a check on official abuse of power. Of course, the countervailing
government interest in prison security may, on balance, outweigh the public
need for the information, as the public need is reflected by the structural
significance standard. All of the Justices appear to agree that if there is a right
to be informed, this right is not absolute. Both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan contemplated the use of a balancing test to determine partic-
ular public access claims.'
2
'
Before Richmond Newspapers, the Court appeared to be split five
Justices to four in opposition to affirmative protection of an information value
of the first amendment. Richmond Newspapers casts some doubt on the
continuing vitality of this division. If Chief Justice Burger's opinion reads as
suggested by Justice Stevens, then perhaps reevaluation of the opposition to a
right to know is occurring.
117. 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 598.
120. Id. at 570-73.
121. Chief Justice Burger stated that absent an "overriding interest articulated in the findings," trials must
be open. Id. at 581. Justice Brennan clearly balanced the societal value of open trials against the state's
countervailing interests in closing them. Id. at 598 n.23.
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C. Individual Opinions of Justices Stewart and Blackmun
Justice Stewart's opinions in the right of access and preferential treat-
ment cases have been confusing and seemingly contradictory. On the one
hand, he would read the press clause of the first amendment to give special
privileges to the press in order to enable it to advance the "broad societal
interest in a full and free flow of information to the public."'2 According to
Justice Stewart, the press has a "constitutionally designated function of in-
forming the public."" On the other hand, he flatly denies that the press has
any special rights of access to government information. 24 Professor BeVier
has pointed out this contradiction:
[I]f the first amendment ought to be read as vindicating a broad societal interest in
a full and free flow of information to the public, and if the press has the constitu-
tionally designated function of informing the public, then it is hardly troublesome
to find the press asserting a right of special access to vindicate society's interest
and perform its own function. '
Justice Stewart's opinion in Richmond Newspapers provides some evidence
that he may be rethinking his position. In Houchins126 he categorically denied
that the first amendment has an access component: "The First and Four-
teenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to informa-
tion generated or controlled by government .... The Constitution does no
more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has
opened its doors."' 27 In Richmond Newspapers Justice Stewart stated that
"the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a
right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal."' 28 In the foot-
note to this statement Justice Stewart cited Mandel'29 and Branzburg 130 for the
propositions, respectively, that the first amendment guarantees a right to
listen and a right to gather information.13' At least with respect to government
processes that traditionally have been open, Justice Stewart appears to have
accepted protection of some rights of access. 132 Of course, he may have
adopted the public forum doctrine as a means of providing public access to
trials while not providing affirmative protection of the right to be informed. If
122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 572 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
124. In an address Justice Stewart stated:
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require
openness from the bureaucracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by
the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
Stewart, Or of the Press, supra note 21, at 636 (footnote omitted).
125. BeVier, supra note 7, at 490.
126. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
127. Id. at 16.
128. 448 U.S. 555, 559 (1980).
129. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
130. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
131. 448 U.S. 555, 599 n.2 (1980).
132. Id. at 598-600.
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
this is the case, however, it is difficult to see why Justice Stewart did not join
in Chief Justice Burger's opinion.
Justice Blackmun's individual opinion in Richmond Newspapers is a case
study of an embattled Justice-or one who thinks himself so-fighting for his
own approach to an issue. Despite his concurrence in the judgment, Justice
Blackmun continues to believe that "the right to a public trial is to be found
where the Constitution explicitly placed it-in the Sixth Amendment." 33 He
adopts the Court's first amendment approach only to reach the result that the
public need to know about the administration of justice is provided some
protection: "I am driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First
Amendment must provide some measure of protection for public access to the
trial." 134
Of the two, Justice Stewart appears to be more likely than Justice
Blackmun to join with the four Justices advocating a right to know to form a
new majority. If such a majority were formed, Justice Brennan's structural
significance test would probably be embraced. The adoption of this test would
eventually force the Court to readdress the question of whether the right of
access to the judicial system includes a right of access to pretrial hearings or
even to penal institutions. If this happened the Court would probably embrace
a generalized right to know, with certain government information, such as
military secrets 135 or other confidential information, being exempted from
access claims. The Court could protect a generalized right to know based
upon the first and fourteenth amendments as a means of ensuring the integrity
of the democratic process; but whether the Court will protect the right to
be informed is still an open question.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his brief for appellants, Richmond Newspapers and its two reporters,
Professor Lawrence Tribe stated that "[s]elf-government presupposes
knowledge; and knowledge of the administration of justice lies at the core of
any society dedicated to the rule of law."' 3 6 No doubt knowledge of the
judicial system is vital to intelligent self-government, but is knowledge of the
operations of the executive and legislative branches, with their vast and intri-
cate network of agencies, subordinate agencies, departments, and councils,
any less vital? Perhaps, in a sense, with the passage of freedom of information
acts and sunshine legislation on both the state and federal levels, 3 7 we do not
need a constitutional right to know at present. But the political climate could
change. The Bill of Rights was intended to secure above and beyond the
majoritarian process certain fundamental rights without which self-govern-
133. Id. at 603.
134. Id at 604.
135. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
136. Brief for Appellant, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
137. See notes 1-2 supra.
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ment would be impossible. The need for protection of fundamental constitu-
tional rights is ever present, no matter what the political climate.
Since there are alternative bases for the holding, and since the Court was
badly divided, Richmond Newspapers is rather weak precedent for a gener-
alized first amendment right to know. At most, the case seems to stand for the
proposition that there is a constitutional right of access to those government
facilities and processes that can boast of a long tradition of openness. At a
minimum, the case possibly stands for nothing more than a revival of the
public forum doctrine. 38 The tension in Richmond Newspapers between the
scope of protection and the alternative doctrinal foundations will probably
bring another right to know case before the Supreme Court. When this hap-
pens, it is to be hoped that the entire Court will squarely address the right to
know question and its implications under the Constitution.
David N. Brockett
138. See Project, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 77, 155 (1980).
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